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SUMMARY
While a single survey is a snapshot of a given moment in time, a series of surveys on the 
same topics over the years is akin to time-lapse photography, tracing the unfurling trends 
of public opinion. In examining the results of surveys conducted in recent decades by EKOS 
Research Associates on Canadians’ views of the economy, the prospects of the middle class, 
immigration and foreign trade, the time-lapse images show a dispiriting pessimism, especially 
among younger Canadians.
For example, in 2002, nearly 70 per cent of Canadians surveyed described themselves as 
middle class. That figure dropped precipitously to just 47 per cent in 2015. Nearly half (46 per 
cent) of those aged 25-44 said they were earning less in inflation-adjusted dollars last year 
than their fathers earned at the same age. Fewer than one in five Canadians believed their 
personal economic lot improved last year. Thirty-seven per cent of respondents said they had 
fallen behind economically in the last year and the last five years. When a society sees shared 
progress as an imperative, it is truly dismal that fewer than one in five Canadians thought 
things had improved for them last year.
Just over a month and a half before the October 2015 federal election, a survey showed that 
restoring middle-class prosperity was the top issue for all demographic groups, standing at 35 
per cent of respondents between the ages of 35 and 49 and 55 per cent among those aged 
49 to 64.
Accompanying this incipient uneasiness about the future of the middle class in Canada is 
a concomitant drawing inwards, a tendency towards parochialism about aspects of foreign 
trade and immigration, which may be perceived as threatening an economic future already 
considered to be tenuous. For example, support dropped dramatically (from 47 per cent 
the year before the 2008 recession to 25 per cent last year) for the notion that Canadians, 
Americans and Mexicans should be free to work anywhere in North America. 
While enthusiasm for immigration traditionally declines during times of economic angst, 
current trends bear watching. Ten years ago, 25 per cent of Canadians surveyed said this 
country had too many immigrants; by 2015, the numbers of respondents who felt this way had practically 
doubled. Caution is urged, however, against reading too much into this, as these latter responses were 
given to a machine, not a live interviewer. People may have thus felt less inhibited about their answers. 
Meanwhile, a majority of Canadians surveyed think that foreign investment or foreign ownership of 
Canadian companies threatens national sovereignty. The 2015 results show a 10-point increase in the 
perception of a threat to sovereignty, compared to seven and 10 years ago. While deploring the state of 
the economy, the Canadian public remains at least somewhat unreceptive to the potentially ameliorative 
force of foreign direct investment, and this attitude appears to be worsening.
Anxiety over Canada’s economic future helped the Liberals attain power in the 2015 federal election. 
Their win has infused the heretofore gloomy economic mood with a shot of hope. There can be no quick 
fix. Dispelling the gloom and replacing it with optimism will depend on the integrated success of efforts 
to liberalize trade, redefine attitudes towards immigration and change perspectives on foreign direct 
investment under the new federal leadership.
1BROAD SHIFTS IN OUTLOOK ON THE ECONOMY
A few years ago, we began noticing something very different about the way the public 
looked at the economy. The public seemed to believe that we were encountering an end 
of progress. The idea of a better life, what is known to the south as the American Dream, 
seemed to be slipping away. Among citizens of both Canada and the United States, there 
was a growing recognition that the middle-class bargain of shared prosperity, which had 
propelled upper North America to pinnacle status in the world economy in the last half of 
the 20th century, was unravelling. We believe that this percolating crisis of the middle class 
is the greatest challenge of our time.
Despite near public consensus on the severity of the issue, and impressive empirical and 
expert support, many in the media and elsewhere deny the problem. And yes, there is still 
relative prosperity in the Canadian economy – we certainly aren’t Spain, let alone Greece. 
The trajectory, however, is clearly to stagnation and decline, except for those at the top of 
the system.
The public is neither deluded nor hysterical. The clarity of public concerns around the issue 
of middle-class decline is remarkable. Moreover, when we unpack this across generational 
cohorts, we can see that the unravelling is much more evident as we move from seniors to 
young Canadians. So while still eminently fixable, the trend lines lead to a very gloomy 
prognosis which is currently infecting public outlook and threatening to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
Consider this troubling syllogism:
 Proposition 1:  IF a healthy society and a strong economy require a growing, 
optimistic middle class;
 Proposition 2: AND IF the middle class is neither growing nor optimistic;
 Implication:  THEN societal health and economic progress will be in peril if 
these negative conditions persist.
As shown in Figure 1, there is a virtual consensus that a growing and optimistic middle 
class is a precondition for societal health and economic prosperity. This consensus position 
reflects the historical record of when nations succeed. Yet, if this consensus is correct, we 
note with alarm that almost nobody thinks that these conditions are in place in Canada. 
To the contrary, the consensus view is that the middle class is shrinking, pessimistic and 
falling back (see Figure 2). 
2FIGURE 1 IMPORTANCE OF A HEALTHY MIDDLE CLASS
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Q. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
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A growing and optimistic middle class is an essential 
component of societal progress
Figure 1: Importance of a healthy middle class
FIGURE 2 STATE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
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Figure 2: State of the middle class
69
66
56
15
18
24
12
13
16
Q. Overall, which of the following choices do you believe best describes 
Canada’s middle class?
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3WHAT HAS CHANGED?
There are important barometers of confidence and we have tested these the same way in 
repeated measures for 20 years or so; the trajectories are clear and revealing. Never in our 
tracking has Canada had such a gloomy outlook on the economic future. Never in our 
tracking has the sense of progress from the past been so meagre.
Fears are highest when turned to the future, particularly concerns about retirement, and 
the fate of future generations. Whereas being middle class used to mean one could attain 
a house, a few luxuries and a better life than one’s parents, it is now all about security, 
which has become the elusive lacuna as it applies to the ability to get by and to retire with 
security. The grey outlook on the present turns almost black as the public ponders the fate 
of future generations (see Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN QUALITY OF LIFE
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Q. Thinking about your overall quality of life do you think the next generation will 
be better off, worse off, or about the same as you are 25 years from now?
BASE: Canadians (half-sample); September 21-25, 2014 (n=774), MOE +/- 3.5%, 19 times out of 20
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Figure 3: Anticipated changes in quality of life
The point isn’t that Canada is in a state of privation and economic distress – it clearly isn’t. 
The point is that the factors that produced progress and success don’t seem to be working in 
the same way anymore. And the problem is accelerating as we move down the generational 
ladder. The current generation – which will both shoulder the responsibilities and harvest 
the fruits of the future – sees itself falling backward and sees an even steeper decline in 
future. The typical optimism of youth is very muted as they encounter an economy that 
doesn’t seem to offer the same promise of shared progress available to their parents and 
grandparents.
4FIGURE 4 SELF-RATED SOCIAL CLASS
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Figure 4: elf-rated social class
BASE (US): Americans; October, 2013 (n=1,600), MOE +/- 2.5%, 19 times out of 20
BASE (CAN): Canadians (half-sample); May 13-19, 2015 (n=1,377), MOE +/- 2.6%, 19 times out of 20
FIGURE 5 MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL OUTLOOK
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Q. Thinking ahead over the next FIVE YEARS or so, do you think your personal 
financial situation will be better or worse than it is today?
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Figure 5: edium-term financial outlook
BASE: Canadians (half-sample); December 7-10, 2015 (n=970), MOE +/- 3.2%, 19 times out of 20
5VERTICAL MOBILITY ERODING
Figure 6 shows a sharp rise in the rate of downward intergenerational mobility as we move 
from seniors to younger Canada (a nearly threefold increase). Arguably, the prime driver of 
this is rising inequality which is increasing quickly across all advanced western economies. 
As Miles Corak notes, the incidence of upward vertical mobility across generations is 
dropping most sharply in those places which are becoming more unequal at an even faster 
pace. 1
FIGURE 6 INCOME RELATIVE TO FATHER*
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Figure 6: Income relative to father*
Q. Thinking about your current annual income and comparing that to what your 
father earned at the same age as you are now, would you say that, using 
inflation-adjusted dollars, you earn more, less, or about the same as your 
father? And what about compared to your mother?
* Lower female labour force participation rate and historical gender inequality confound mother comparison
BASE: Canadians; May 12-19, 2015 (n=2,331), MOE +/- 2.0%, 19 times out of 20
The economic ladder is missing rungs in the middle and people are less motivated to 
try climbing with those conditions in place. Merit is less relevant as the system is now 
“stickier” at the top and bottom of the social ladder. This failure of the incentive system 
is hobbling innovation and effort and creating a more tepid growth pattern where the 
relatively slower growing pie is appropriated by an ever slenderer cohort at the top. We 
are literally killing the goose that lays the golden eggs underpinning healthy middle-class 
economies.
If one thinks this problem is self-correcting or going away, ponder Figure 7. Very few 
Canadians think their financial situation is improving, but the sense of progress seems to 
get smaller as we move from 10- to five- to one-year comparisons. What does it say about 
1 Corak, Miles, “The Economics of the Great Gatsby Curve: A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words,” Jan. 18, 2012. Available 
online at: http://goo.gl/V3q6VA
6an economy which defines shared progress as an economic and moral imperative, that fewer 
than one in five thinks their lot improved last year?
FIGURE 7 SELF-RATED PROGRESS
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Figure 7: Self-rated progress
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MOST IMPORTANT ELECTION ISSUE
It is instructive to consider what was on the minds of the Canadian electorate going into 
the recent federal election. One of our tracking questions asked respondents which of four 
issues they thought should be the most important for the election, giving them a choice 
among economic issues, ethics and accountability, social issues, and fiscal issues. Figure 
8 shows the trends over time in responses to that question going into the 2015 federal 
election. Fiscal issues, and ethics and accountability, were consistently seen as the much 
less important of the four choices. However, some marked changes were evident regarding 
the other two choices. Economic issues, over the entire period, were clearly seen as more 
important than social issues. But, at the end of 2014, the two were rated equally important. 
The importance of social issues dropped for the first few months of 2015, and then rose 
again over the spring months, but fell once more as the election got into gear and economic 
issues became clearly rated as the most important.
7FIGURE 8 MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE (V1)
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Q. Of the following issues, which one do you think should be the most important 
issue for the next federal election?
Figure 8: Most important issue (v1)
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BASE: Canadians (half-sample); August 26-September 1, 2015 (n=1,606), MOE +/- 2.5%, 19 times out of 20
Figure 9 shows a breakdown by age of a second version of the question, this time asking 
respondents to choose the more important of issues related to security and terrorism, 
democratic renewal, issues related to the environment and climate change, and restoring 
middle-class progress. The data are from the last week of August 2015. Here, security and 
terrorism, and democratic renewal, are clearly seen as less important than the environment 
and climate change, which, in turn, is clearly second to restoring middle-class progress. 
The chief variation by age is that, among the 35-49 group, security and terrorism ties with 
climate change as second most important, and restoring middle-class progress, while still 
the most important, is not so by as large a margin as in the older age groups.
8FIGURE 9 MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE (V2)
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Figure 9: Most important issue (v2)
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CLOSING OF THE CANADIAN MIND?
It is not surprising that in the context of these deep anxieties about an age of stagnation 
and rising inequality that Canadians’ attitudes to the external world and globalization are 
being affected. If we think of globalization as a three-legged stool, with immigration being 
about the flow of people across borders, and trade being the flow of goods and services 
across borders, then foreign direct investment (FDI) can be seen as the third leg of this 
stool, with the flow of capital across borders. For this reason, placing it in this broader 
context illuminates our understanding of attitudes to FDI. In fact, we will see that declining 
enthusiasm for FDI mirrors similar declines in support for immigration and further trade 
liberalization.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Canadians seemed downright allergic to trade. As we 
moved into the 21st century, we saw a dramatic about-face and Canadians expressed an 
unbridled enthusiasm for trade and globalization. In recent years, however, a variety of 
factors have led to more guarded views on globalization and trade. These would include 
economic stagnation and anxiety, and geopolitical tensions and security concerns. The 
result may be an increase in parochialism among Canadians that was not the case at the 
turn of the century.
9Figure 10 shows that attitudes toward free trade declined steadily over the 1980s, and then 
became more favourable as the economy recovered from the early 1990s recession. Since 
2000, however, there is some suggestion of a moderate decline in the favourability of those 
attitudes.
FIGURE 10 SUPPORT FOR TRILATERAL TRADE
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Q. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: There should be free trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico
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Figure 10: Support for tri-lateral trade
BASE: Canadians (half-sample); June 30-July 7, 2015 (n=1,043), MOE +/- 3.0%, 19 times out of 20
Similarly, Figure 11 shows that there has been a marked increase in Canadians’ uncertainty 
regarding whether there should be unfettered labour mobility throughout North America. 
Just one-quarter of Canadians (25 per cent) believe that Canadians, Americans and 
Mexicans should be able to work anywhere in North America, compared to 47 per cent a 
year before the 2008 recession. Data also suggest declining support for a common Canada-
United States-Mexico North American security perimeter (see Figure 12).
10
FIGURE 11 NORTH AMERICAN LABOUR MOBILITY
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Figure 11: North American labour mobility
Q. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
"Canadians, Americans and Mexicans should be able to work anywhere in North 
America".
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FIGURE 12 NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY PERIMETER
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Figure 12: North American security perimeter
Q. Given recent events would you support or oppose Canada, the United States and 
Mexico establishing a common security perimeter (i.e., around all of North 
America)?
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Additionally, there is evidence that attitudes toward immigration and diversity may be 
hardening. Canada has experienced a large influx of immigrants over the past 20 years. 
Over this period, the incidence of immigration from members of visible minority groups 
has burgeoned and Canada has morphed from a largely white society with ancestry drawn 
from Britain and France to an extremely heterogeneous society. Figure 13 shows how 
the initial deep reservations about immigration dropped consistently over that period 
as we became more diverse. Multiculturalism was embraced by the public and the dire 
warnings of ethnic enclaves and diminution of national identity failed to occur. In our 
research, we found that national attachment has remained very high in Canada and that 
ethnic identifications actually dropped considerably.2 So not only did the “selling illusions” 
predictions of increased ethnic ghettoization not occur, but the reverse became true.
FIGURE 13 ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION/VISIBLE MINORITIES
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Q. In your opinion do you feel that there are too few, too many or about the right number of immigrants 
coming to Canada?
Q. Forgetting about the overall number of immigrants coming to Canada, OF THOSE WHO COME would you 
say there are too few, too many or the right amount who are MEMBERS OF VISIBLE MINORITIES?
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NOTE: EKOS began using IVR in 2009, which allows respondents to submit their 
responses anonymously to a machine, rather than a live interviewer. We believe the 
gap between 2005 and 2013 is partially distorted by the fact that people are more 
candid without a live interviewer present.
Figure 13: Attitudes to immigration/visible minorities
BASE: Canadians (third-sample); April 1-7, 2015 (n=1,184/1,075), MOE +/- 2.9/3.0%, 19 times out of 20
Also notable were the divergent paths of public opinion in Canada and the United States 
following the Sept. 11 attacks. In both countries, there was a sharp rise in opposition to 
immigration, but in Canada, it dissipated in the following years and reached an all-time 
low in 2005 (with only 25 per cent saying there were too many immigrants and fewer than 
one in five saying that of those coming, too many were visible minority members). By stark 
contrast, the opposition levels were nearly three times higher in the United States, despite 
incoming levels of much less than half. Canadians were pro-trade, pro-immigration and 
pro-diversity. This seemed to provide not only a societal advantage, but quite possibly an 
economic advantage in an increasingly globalized economy.
2 EKOS Research Associates, “Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Part 4,” Jan. 4, 2013. Available online at:  
http://goo.gl/7KXTNA
12
Fast forward to 2015, however, and the results paint a starkly different picture. The overall 
incidence of opposition to immigration has nearly doubled and is threatening to crack the 
53 per cent level we saw in 1993. Furthermore, the racial discrimination test, (forgetting 
about the numbers coming, are too many not white?) has just crossed the 40-point threshold 
for the first time ever.
However, these trends must be interpreted with caution. Those surveys conducted prior to 
2008 employed a live interviewer, whereas the more recent surveys used IVR technology, 
which involves responding not to a person, but to a machine. We have experimental 
evidence showing that responding to a live interviewer inhibits the “too many” response to 
these questions.
In addition, the economic uncertainty that arose with the 2008 recession seems to persist 
through 2015. So, the evidence does not permit concluding that there was a hardening of 
these attitudes beyond the usual increase in opposition to immigration that traditionally 
accompanies increased economic uncertainty. Nonetheless, because of the implications 
of such attitudes for social cohesion and because the data do not permit ruling out the 
possibility that an unusual increase has occurred, attitudes in this area deserve future 
scrutiny.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA
Given the media attention towards a number of high profile foreign acquisitions in recent 
years (e.g., Nexen), it is perhaps not surprising that the vast majority of Canadians perceive 
a rise in foreign ownership. Figure 14 shows that whether asked about U.S. and foreign 
ownership or just foreign ownership of Canadian companies, three-quarters of Canadians 
perceive such ownership to be higher than it was 20 years earlier.
13
FIGURE 14 PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
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Figure 14: Perceptions of foreign ownership
Q. Do you think the rate of foreign ownership / U.S. and foreign ownership of 
Canadian companies is higher or lower then it was 20 years ago?
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Similarly, in that same survey, three-quarters of Canadians evince either some or great 
concern regarding the level of foreign ownership. Tracking these concerns over foreign 
ownership reveals that the proportion of Canadians who are “very” concerned showed 
a slight decrease in surveys in 2007 and 2008, but returned to its 2005 level in the 2015 
survey, with a suggestion that the number of Canadians who are unconcerned may have 
dropped slightly (see Figure 16).
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FIGURE 15 CONCERNS OVER FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
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Figure 15: Concerns over foreign ownership
Q. Overall, how concerned are you about the rate of U.S. and foreign ownership 
of Canadian companies?
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FIGURE 16 TRACKING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP CONCERNS
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Figure 16: Tracking foreign ownership concerns
Q. Overall, how concerned are you about the rate of U.S. and foreign ownership 
of Canadian companies?
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FIGURE 17 SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
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Figure 17: Support for foreign ownership
Q. Would you say you support or oppose the purchase of Canadian businesses by 
FOREIGN-OWNED/FOREIGN STATE-OWNED companies?
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FIGURE 18 TRACKING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP*
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Figure 18: Tracking foreign ownership*
Q. Would you say you support or oppose the purchase of Canadian businesses by 
FOREIGN-OWNED companies?
*Figures adjusted to exclude those who did not provide valid responses.
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Figure 17 shows that upwards of three-quarters of Canadians are at least somewhat 
opposed to the purchase of Canadian companies by foreign-owned companies and, further, 
that the proportion who is strongly opposed increases when the purchase is by a state-
owned company. Comparing the 2015 results to earlier surveys in 2005 and 2008 shows 
that opposition to the purchase of Canadian companies by foreign-owned companies has 
increased somewhat (see Figure 18).
When asked whether foreign investment in Canada, or foreign ownership of Canadian 
companies, is a threat to Canada’s sovereignty, a majority of Canadians agree that it is, 
with the proportion agreeing that it is a threat 10 per cent higher when it is described as 
purchasing companies, than when described as investment (see Figure 19).
FIGURE 19 THREAT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Copyright 2015
No reproduction without permission
Figure 19: Threat of foreign investment
Q. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA / FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF 
CANADIAN COMPANIES is a threat to Canada's sovereignty.
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BASE: Canadians (half-sample each); September 14-22, 2015
BASE: (n=965), MOE +/- 3.2%, 19 times out of 20
BASE: (n=1,000), MOE +/- 3.1%, 19 times out of 20
Comparing those 2015 perceptions to perceptions in surveys in 2005 and 2008, we see that 
there has been a 10-point increase in the perception of a threat to sovereignty (see Figure 20).
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FIGURE 20 TRACKING THREAT OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
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Figure 20: Tracking threat of foreign ownership
Q. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: Foreign ownership of Canadian companies is a threat to Canada's 
sovereignty.
FIGURE 21 AWARENESS OF TPP
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FIGURE 22 SUPPORT FOR TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
FIGURE 23 TRACKING SUPPORT FOR TPP*
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CONCLUSIONS AND A POSTSCRIPT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE RECENT 
FEDERAL ELECTION
Canadians have deep anxieties about the economy, both in the short and long term. 
Economic stagnation, aging, geopolitical tensions, etc., have had a corrosive impact on our 
openness. Canadians’ minds are not closed yet, but seem to show some signs of closing. 
Foreign direct investment may be getting caught in this vortex.
Are we seeing a closing of the Canadian mind when it comes to both the economy and 
societal receptivity to globalization (in this case, immigration, trade and foreign direct 
investment)? While this closing has not reached a stage of isolationism or parochialism, 
some signs of such tendencies are there.
Are we moving from unbridled globalists to incipient isolationists? There is a wide 
but fairly superficial negativity to foreign direct investment (but it seems to be getting 
worse). Public views are not yet set or intense, but they are not currently receptive and the 
trajectory points to less receptiveness in the future. Opposition is significant, but mostly 
modest.
Everything comes into question when people are not seeing any progress. An increased 
allergy to investment may well be impeding our ability to restart middle-class progress. 
The same dampening of openness is evident in attitudes to immigration and trade. Our 
most recent sounding on support for TPP shows it declining from clear majority support to 
a dead heat. Yet, ironically, many would argue that more openness in immigration, trade 
and foreign direct investment may be plausible parts of the solution to restarting middle-
class progress.
There is no quick fix. The public will consider events on an ad hoc basis (for example, 
Canadians didn’t blink at Tim Hortons, but went apoplectic about Nexen). We need to raise 
public literacy and public engagement in the debate. Further, language matters – Canadians 
are much more receptive to foreign investment than they are to foreign ownership.
As a final note, we recently had a very important election in Canada which produced the 
highest voter turnout since 1993. The issue of what ails the economy and how to fix it was 
a central component of this election. The Liberals’ success was rooted in a commitment to 
focus on the issue of middle-class progress. While views of the economy remain locked in a 
very grey outlook, there has been a notable spike up in medium-term optimism. The voters 
laid a wager that the Liberals’ plan would be better in the medium term than the path we had 
been on. The place of trade liberalization, immigration and, yes, FDI, will become part of a 
vigorous debate to define the new blueprint for restarting progress and shared prosperity.
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